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I. INTRODUCTION
I have to confess that when I first heard the topic for this panel, I laughed. Why
would we want to talk about class and the Equal Protection Clause under the
Roberts Court? As everybody who studies the Constitution knows, the Supreme
Court long ago rejected the idea that the poor are a suspect or semisuspect class
under the Equal Protection Clause in cases like Dandridge v. Williams,' James v.
Valtierra,2 and San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez.3 Moreover,
the Court has not struck down a welfare classification on constitutional grounds in
thirty-four years and counting.4 If in its headier days the Supreme Court failed to
take class seriously as an equal protection category, then why even ask the question
in the days of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito? As one of my colleagues
quipped when hearing about this panel, my talk might as well be entitled "Is There
a Number Less Than Zero?"
On further reflection, however, the joke is not so funny. Careful examination
of the caselaw leads me to three quite serious conclusions. First, the existing body
of constitutional doctrine takes class more seriously than the above caricature
*Associate Professor of Law, Seattle University School of Law. B.A., Yale University, 1993; M.A.
in History, Princeton University, 1997; J.D., New York University School of Law, 1999. This Essay
is a revised version of the remarks I gave at the symposium. I would like to thank Kristina Cooper and
Jim Sullivan for their invitation to participate in the symposium. I would also like to thank my former
colleague Tommy Crocker and my current colleague Jan Ainsworth for their help in conceptualizing
my presentation.
1. 397 U.S. 471, 486 (1970) (holding that a regulation that capped welfare benefits, regardless of
the size of the family, was valid under the Equal Protection Clause).
2. 402 U.S. 137, 142-43 (1971) (holding that plaintiffs, who were eligible for low cost housing
because of their low income status, had not been discriminated against by California's use of a
mandatory referendum and, thus, the law did not violate the Equal Protection Clause).
3. 411 U.S. 1, 18 (1973) (holding that the plaintiffs challenging Texas's system of school funding
and residing in poorer districts were not a suspect class that warranted heightened judicial scrutiny).
4. For a particularly thorough and adept telling of this story, see Stephen Loffredo, Poverty,
Democracy and Constitutional Law, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1277 (1993).
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would indicate. Second, the Rehnquist Court, though not a major innovator in this
area, largely respected the doctrinal status quo. Finally, there are a number of
reasons to think the Roberts Court might be unwilling to do the same. Hence, the
title of my talk: From Bad to Worse?. Some Early Speculation About the Roberts
Court and the Constitutional Fate of the Poor.
11. THE CONSTITUTION, CLASS, AND EQUALITY
The blackletter law is quite clear: despite the best effort of a sophisticated
group of lawyers and advocates in the 1960s and early 1970s, wealth and poverty
classifications are treated like all other forms of general economic and social
legislation and subjected only to rational basis review when challenged under the
Equal Protection Clause.6 However, as my former students in the audience are
probably tired of hearing me say, the blackletter law often hides as much as it
reveals. In actuality, the Court has utilized a variety of constitutional doctrines in
a very pragmatic way to afford a modest amount of constitutional protection to the
economically disadvantaged.
Examples abound. Take, for instance, the well-established line of cases that
hold that the inability to pay fees cannot be used to prevent someone from filing a
criminal appeal,7 filing for divorce,8 voting,9 or running for office.'0 It is illegal to
imprison people simply for nonpayment of fines that they cannot afford to pay."
Durational residency requirements are unconstitutional for the provision of
important services like welfare benefits 2 and nonemergency medical care. 3 Under
Goldberg v. Kelly 4 and its progeny, the Court has insisted on substantial procedural
due process protections for the loss of governmental benefits. 5 In a couple of
difficult-to-decipher cases, United States Department ofAgriculture v. Moreno 6
5. My marginally optimistic reading of the caselaw draws upon the work of Frank Michelman and
Lawrence Sager. See LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES: A THEORY OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE 95 102 (2004); Frank I. Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional
Democracy, 1979 WASH. U. L. REV. 659 (advancing the theory that the Constitution and caselaw
support a constitutional right to a certain standard of living that enables people to exist and participate
in a democratic society).
6. See Loffredo, supra note 4, at 1278.
7. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956); cf Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356-57
(1963) (holding that if state law provides a right to appeal a criminal conviction, indigent defendants
have the right to a state-appointed lawyer for the first such appeal).
8. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380-81 (1971); cf Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 16-17
(1981) (holding that an indigent defendant in a paternity action is entitled to free blood testing).
9. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966).
10. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 149 (1972).
11. See, e.g., Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 398-99 (1971) (holding that the imprisonment of an
indigent man for nonpayment of traffic fines violated the Equal Protection Clause); Williams v. Illinois,
399 U.S. 235, 241 (1970) (holding that a state may not continue to imprison a convicted defendant
beyond the statutory maximum for inability to pay the fine and court costs due under his sentence).
12. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969).
13. Mem'l Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 269-70 (1974).
14. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
15. See, e.g., id. at 270 71 (holding that welfare recipients whose benefits were to be terminated
were entitled to confrontation and cross-examination of the state's witnesses, as well as an "impartial
decision maker").
16. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
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and United States Department ofAgriculture v. Murry," the Supreme Court has
even held that it is unconstitutional to deny benefits to otherwise eligible
individuals simply because of disapproval of their living arrangements. 8
For a slightly more opaque example, consider Plyler v. Doe,19 a case that the
student commentator discusses in his contribution to the symposium.2" Plyler holds
that states cannot exclude students from public schools because of their parents'
immigration status.2' While the rationale for that decision has been widely
debated,22 the one theme that clearly runs through the majority and concurring
opinions is the Justices' belief that the Constitution does not countenance
government action that creates or perpetuates a permanent underclass.
Another milepost in the constitutional protection of the poor is the Court's
decision in Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,23 which struck down most of the
loitering and antivagrancy statutes then in existence.24 While at first blush the
decision may seem more closely related to individual rights or criminal procedure,
such statutes have historically been used, first and foremost, to regulate and harass
the poor. When you combine Papachristou with the cases discussed above, which
hold that states cannot limit or even significantly burden the ability of indigents
to establish residence in a new community,25 it becomes clear that the Court has
taken the surprisingly bold step of declaring unconstitutional both of the major
mechanisms localities have traditionally used to regulate class.
Taking all of these cases together, it is apparent that the Court has read the
Constitution in a manner that provides a surprising number of protections to the
economically disadvantaged. To be sure, the decisions are not particularly
expansive, but when stitched together, they are not trivial either. The big picture is
that the Court has rejected a broad proclamation that the Constitution provides
affirmative rights to material well-being or even shows particular solicitude for the
poor. But, around the margins, the Court has made a series of pragmatic
accommodations that suggest that equality and fairness to the poor are values of a
constitutional dimension.
17. 413 U.S. 508 (1973).
18. See Moreno, 413 U.S. at 537 38; Murry, 413 U.S. at 514.
19. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
20. Daniel S. Greenspahn, A Constitutional Right to Learn: The Uncertain Allure Making a
Federal Case out of Education, 59 S.C. L. REV. 755, 760 (2008).
21. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 226, 230.
22. See, e.g., Elizabeth Hull, Undocumented Alien Children and Free Public Education: An
Analysis of Plyler v. Doe, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 409, 419-26, 428-31 (1983) (analyzing the majority
opinion and discussing the immediate positive and negative effects of the Court's decision); Maria
Pabon Lopez, Reflections on Educating Latino and Latina Undocumented Children: Beyond Plyler v.
Doe, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 1373, 1385 91 (2005) (questioning the Court's use of rational basis
scrutiny in Plyler v. Doe).
23. 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
24. See id. at 171.
25. See, e.g., Mem'l Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 269-70 (1974); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969).
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111. THE REHNQUIST COURT HOLDS THE LINE
Now we turn our attention to the Rehnquist Court, the second of the three
topics discussed in this Essay. As scholars try to figure out the legacy of the
Rehnquist Court,26 one reality that confounds is that the Court moved very rapidly
and very aggressively to the right in some areas of the law;2 basically protected the
status quo in other areas;28 and moved rapidly to the right for a while and then
stopped abruptly in still a third set of areas.2 9 In determining which areas of the law
fall into which category, a major factor to be considered is the point at which
Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Anthony Kennedy concluded that the existing
precedents struck the right balance between competing values.3 ° That is kind of the
stopping brake on the mechanism. Somewhat surprisingly in the broad area
discussed in this topic whether referred to as "The Constitution and Social
Welfare," "TheRights ofthePoor," or"Class andthe Constitution"-the Rehnquist
Court pretty much protected the status quo. The Court did very little to unravel the
pragmatic compromise that was at the heart of the prior generation's doctrine.3'
26. For my contribution to the collective project of writing the history of the Rehnquist Court, see
Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the Courts: Hostility to Litigation as an Organizing Theme in the
Rehnquist Court's Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1097 (2006). For a thorough, albeit incomplete,
bibliography of other works attempting to do the same, see id. at 1099 n. 1.
27. Federalism is the classic example. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 19,
627 (2000) (striking down a claim brought under the Violence Against Women Act as exceeding the
scope of Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,
thus relegating regulation of this area of the law to the states); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 13
(1999) (upholding states' immunity from suit in state court without consent); Printz v. United States,
521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (holding that, in reference to the Brady Act's requirements that state law
enforcement officers conduct background checks on individuals seeking to purchase handguns,
"Congress cannot compel the States to enact or enforce a federal regulatory program"); Seminole Tribe
v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 76 (1996) (holding that Congress could not subject states to suit in federal court
under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (holding
that the Gun-Free School Zones Act exceeded Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause, thus
leaving this area of the law to be exclusively regulated by the states); New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144, 177 (1992) (holding that the "take title" provision ofthe Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy
Amendments Act of 1985 was outside Congress's powers and infringed on state sovereignty).
28. The Court's decisions upholding important precedents against furious challenges include
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 27 (2003) (endorsing Justice Powell's qualified acceptance of
affirmative action in Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 271 72 (1978), and
validating continued use of affirmative action under certain circumstances); Dickerson v. United States,
530 U.S. 428, 432 (2000) (validating the continued use of the rules from Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966), and stating that the case was a "constitutional decision" and therefore could not be
overturned by an act of Congress); and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 845-46 (1992) (preserving the "essential holding" of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113(1973)).
29. Takings is a prime example. Compare Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l
Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 341-42 (2002) (showing substantial deference to local land-use
regulators and holding that a temporary building moratorium designed to facilitate sensible land-use
planning did not constitute a compensable taking), with Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,
1019, 1031 (1992) (creating a new per se regulatory takings rule and portending other substantial curbs
on the ability of states to enact comprehensive land-use regulations without paying compensation).
30. For one interesting take on this phenomenon, see J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Rehnquist Court
at Twilight: The Lures and Perils of Split-the-Difference Jurisprudence, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1969,
1972-80 (2006).
3 1. See discussion supra Part II.
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There are at least three cases I can think of in which the Court had prime
opportunities to overrule or to limit some of the precedents that are discussed
above. All of these were cases that in fact required the Court to stretch-just a little
bit, but still stretch and expand doctrines that protected the poor. These are classic
examples of cases in which the Court, if it had wanted to, could have overruled
precedents, or it could have moved the law to the right without overruling
precedents by wedging in some kind of distinction between precedent and the case
at hand. In many of the areas the Court cared about the most federalism,32 private
rights of action,3 3 and even to some extent, abortion 34 -the Court chose the latter
option and while not overruling the precedents that pointed toward their less
favored result, simply distinguished them on very flimsy grounds.
35
In three cases, over the dissent of some combination of Justices Rehnquist,
Scalia, and Thomas,36 the Court rejected opportunities to either overrule or
distinguish precedents protective of the poor, and rather remained true to the letter
and spirit of the prior generation's pragmatic compromise. The first case is M.L.B.
v. S.L.J.,37 which addressed whether a state can make the right to appeal an order
terminating parental rights contingent on the parent's ability to pay substantial
fees.38 The Court stated "no," 39 based on precedents from other areas of family
law.4"
Then there is Saenz v. Roe,4 which raised an issue similar to the one presented
in Shapiro v. Thompson.42 In Shapiro, the Court addressed whether a state can
impose durational residency requirements for the receipt of welfare benefits. 43 In
Saenz, the question was not whether a state may bar new arrivals from receiving
benefits but whether the state can limit the level of benefits to those received in the
previous state of residence.44 Again, the Court said "no," reaffirming and slightly
expanding prior precedent.45
32. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144, 177 (1992); supra note 27.
33. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 284 88 (2001).
34. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 845-46 (1992).
35. For my discussion of the Court's use of this technique in one prototypical area of its
jurisprudence, see Siegel, supra note 26, at 1118 29 (discussing cases involving the availability and
scope of federal remedies).
36. City ofChi. v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999) (Thomas, J.,joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia,
J., dissenting); Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999) (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by Thomas, J., dissenting);
M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996) (Thomas, J.,joined by Scalia, J. and,joined in part, by Rehnquist,
C.I, dissenting).
37. 519 U.S. 102.
38. Id. at 107.
39. Id. at 128.
40. Id. at 116 19.
41. 526 U.S. 489.
42. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
43. Id. at 621 22.
44. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 492.
45. Saen:, 526 U.S. at 507. However, in reaching its conclusion the Court relied on the
Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, id. at 506-507, while the Court based its decision
in Shapiro on the Due Process Clause, 394 U.S. at 643 44.
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Finally, it is worth looking at City of Chicago v. Morales,46 which raised
questions about the scope of Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville47 and the
constitutional prohibition on antiloitering and antivagrancy ordinances."
Responding to the constitutional concerns expressed in Papachristou, many
localities drafted much more narrowly tailored antiloitering provisions; these
statutes were easy to distinguish-in fact and perhaps even in principle-from the
statutes invalidated in Papachristou. Over strong objections, the Court quite clearly
and quite boldly rejected the opportunity to distinguish the earlier decision and
reaffirmed its commitment to the proposition that most antiloitering and
antivagrancy statutes violate the right to move freely and congregate on public
streets and sidewalks.4 9
These three cases suggest that in three different areas, the Rehnquist Court was
comfortable with the existing precedent regarding the constitutional rights of the
poor and the constitutional status of classifications based on wealth. There are
several other cases worthy of mention that, while not as directly on point as others,
do suggest the same kind of respect for the existing doctrinal settlement. One of
these cases is Halbert v. Michigan,0 which was one of the last cases the Rehnquist
Court decided. The case addressed a defendant's right to a state-appointed lawyer
in a criminal appeal.5 In earlier cases, the Court had held that individuals have a
right to state-appointed counsel for their first appeal "as of right."52 In Halbert, the
Court had to decide whether the labeling of an initial appeal from a guilty plea as
"discretionary" rather than "as of right" allowed the state to sidestep the earlier
cases and avoid appointment ofa lawyer.53 The Court said "no," defendants are still
entitled to a lawyer.54
Additional examples include Nevada Department of Human Resources v.
Hibbs"5 and Tennessee v. Lane. 6 Here, in a very different civil rights context, the
Court demonstrated its pragmatism, assessing real world consequences and
upholding statutes that under the pure logic of its more recent decisions might be
in doubt." Finally, notice Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,5 8 a campaign
finance case. Here, the conservative Court talked about the dangers of
46. 527 U.S. 41 (1999).
47. 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
48. Morales, 527 U.S. at 45-46.
49. Id. at 53-54 (recognizing "the freedom to loiter for innocent purposes").
50. 545 U.S. 605 (2005).
51. Id. at 609.
52. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963).
53. Halbert, 545 U.S. at 612-14.
54. Id. at 623 24.
55. 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
56. 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
57. In Hibbs, the Court held that Congress acted within its Section Five power when it abrogated
states' immunity by enacting the family-care provision ofthe Family and Medical Leave Act. 538 U.S.
at 735. In Lane, the Court upheld title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, finding the
statute to be another valid exercise of Congress's power under Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 541 U.S. at 533-34.
58. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
[Vol. 59: 851
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concentrations of wealth59 and validated the power of legislatures to constrain the
influence of such concentrated wealth on the political process.6"
I will not claim that the Rehnquist Court was some kind of left-wing Court,
even on issues of class. But as a general matter, the Court refrained from deciding
these issues as much as possible. When the Court did weigh in, however, it
respected the pragmatic settlement of prior generations.
IV. FIVE REASONS TO DOUBT THAT THE ROBERTS COURT WILL DO THE SAME
That brings us to the Roberts Court, which in many areas of the law continues
the project of the Rehnquist Court. However, there are good reasons to question
whether we can expect such continuity in cases that raise issues of class. There are
some significant early signs that the Roberts Court might be unwilling to accede to
the existing pragmatic compromise that provides interstitial constitutional
protection for the poor. There are five overlapping reasons for this prediction that
I want to discuss.
First, obviously, is the identity of the Justices. Substituting Justice Samuel
Alito for Justice Sandra Day O'Connor is a big change. In some areas of the law,
as everyone who has studied the Court knows, this substitution does not make much
of a difference because Justice O'Connor was already a lost cause, routinely siding
with the conservative members of the Court. But as the cases I have been discussing
indicate, on the issue of class she was a moderate, voting in favor of providing
interstitial constitutional protection for the poor in all three cases.6
Somewhat more surprisingly, the substitution of current Chief Justice John
Roberts for former Chief Justice William Rehnquist is also a loss in this regard.
Former Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented in all three of those cases,62 and he was
certainly critical of some of the underlying precedents in his early years on the
Court.63 But these cases did not arouse the same animosity from the Chief Justice
later in his life. It was a pragmatic compromise, and Chief Justice Rehnquist was
to some extent a pragmatist. He would listen to consequentialist arguments,
particularly in his later years. Hibbs is a perfect example of a case in which he
59. Id. at 658 60 (describing the potential for corruption and noting that "the resources in the
treasury of a business corporation . . . are not an indication of popular support for the corporation's
political ideas" (quoting Fed. Election Comm'n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 258
(1986)) (first alteration omitted, second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
60. Id. at 668 69.
61. See City ofChi. v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999); Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999); M.L.B.
v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996).
62. See cases cited supra note 61.
63. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 253 54 (1982) (Burger, C.J., joined by Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority opinion's conclusion that a state may not withhold funds to
schools that admitted children of illegal immigrants); Mem'l Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250,
285 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (voting to uphold the residency requirement in order to receive
nonemergent medical care, finding no precedent for such a right); U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413
U.S. 528, 546-47 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the Court's conclusion that
Congress could not withhold welfare benefits because of living arrangements and finding Congress's
concern with fraud to be a rational one).
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stepped outside of rigid formalism to talk about the consequences of the Court's
rulings.64
Chief Justice Rehnquist was born in a different generation, a generation in
which the conservative project for the Court was more results-oriented, and he was
a more results-oriented jurist. In contrast, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito
came of age in the Reagan Justice Department. As I and others have noted, that
fact is likely to be one of the dominant factors when analyzing the Court in the
coming years. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito are participants in an
ideological movement committed to a certain way of looking at the law. At the
center of this movement's critiques lies the idea that many decisions of the Warren
Court, including the decisions I have discussed in this Essay, were squishy,
intellectually indefensible, left-wing votes of the heart.66 This conservative
movement has claimed that the Court needs to assume a more traditional judicial
role in which reason and logic control, reasoning is very formal, and consequences
matter little.67 So, I am worried that Chief Justice Roberts is, in many ways, more
of a radical formalist than Chief Justice Rehnquist was and that such an outlook has
implications in several areas of the law, including, notably, the constitutional status
of the poor.
The formalism of the Roberts Court, in fact, is my second theme. Of particular
note is Chief Justice Roberts's opinion in Parents Involved in Community Schools
v. Seattle School District No. I.68 The opinion seems to be asking only into what
doctrinal category statutes fit and then assumes that once the doctrinal category is
determined, the rule is clear and the result comes out of some machine.69 This type
of logic is typical of several cases that the Roberts Court has decided. For example,
Bowles v. Russell,70 a case from last Term that received almost as much press as
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.," decided only a few days earlier. In
Bowles, a judge erroneously told a litigant that he had a few extra days to file his
notice of appeal.72 When the litigant met the erroneous deadline but missed the
actual deadline, the judge allowed him to continue forward with the appeal.7" In
reviewing the case, the Supreme Court asked whether the rule regarding the
64. Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 730-32 (2003) (discussing ramifications
for gender equity in the workplace, particularly the fact that women are more likely to take time off to
care for sick and aging relatives); see also Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434 35, 440
(2000) (reaffirming the rules from Miranda for largely pragmatic reasons, particularly the history of
coerced confessions).
65. See David D. Kirkpatrick, In Alito, G.O.P. Reaps Harvest Planted in '82, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30,
2006, at Al, A18; Posting of Andrew Siegel to PrawfsBlawg, http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/
prawfsblawg/2007/06/meet-the-robert.html (June 26, 2007, 10:43 EST).
66. Siegel, supra note 65.
67. Id.
68. 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
69. See id at 2755-57 (plurality opinion) (finding that racial balancing to achieve diversity was
not a compelling interest recognized by the Court and that the school districts' attendance zones were
not narrowly tailored and thus the plans failed under a strict scrutiny analysis).
70. 127 S. Ct. 2360 (2007).
71. 127 S. Ct. 2162 (2007).
72. Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at 2362.
73. Id.
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appellate deadline is a "mandatory and jurisdictional" rule or a discretionary one."
The Court determined that it was a jurisdictional rule and that no equitable relief
was possible.75 In other words, the poor guy was out of luck. This is only one of
several classic formalist cases.
In some ways, this formalism is laudable.76 To a certain extent, I agree with the
view that the job of a judge is to blind oneself to certain consequences as outside
the realm of constitutionally-relevant facts, and to only consider the rules and
structure of doctrine. But in the end, this view ignores the fact that the fidelity one
owes as a judge is to the Constitution, not to the doctrinal categories or the rules
that judges of prior generations have come up with.7 At some point, if the
conclusions a judge reaches using the doctrinal categories are so foreign to the
constitutional promises of equality and liberty, then the fidelity that judge owes to
the Constitution requires a reconsideration of doctrinal premises. And in fact, the
pragmatic "accommodationalism" illustrated by the class cases is an example of
one sort of coping strategy that Professor Roosevelt and others have written about
regarding what to do when the doctrine no longer works.78 At least for a while,
rather than tearing down the doctrinal structure, such an approach allows judges to
incorporate the greater constitutional commitments into the doctrine and protect
their methods of reasoning. After all, there are costs-predictability for one-to
tearing down doctrinal structures every five minutes. The Roberts Court seems
unsympathetic to that kind of accommodationalist project. All indications are that
it has confused doctrine with the Constitution in some fundamental way.
In a similar vein, the Roberts Court seems strikingly unwilling to take real
world consequences into account in its rulings. Lilly Ledbetter, the plaintiff in
Ledbetter,79 said a lot of things better than most people can. When she testified
before Congress, one of the things she said, agreeing with a comment made by
Justice Ginsburg, was that the ruling in her case did not "make sense in the real
74. Id. at 2363 (quoting Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 61 (1982) (per
curiam)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
75. Id. at 2366.
76. Professor Thomas Crocker and Professor Teresa Stanton Collett engaged in a spirited
exchange on the subject during the conference. Their exchange inspired the ideas of this paragraph.
77. Discussion of the relationship between constitutional meaning and constitutional doctrine is
currently one ofthe most popular topics in constitutional theory. For a few ofthe more influential works
in this vein, see RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION (2001); Mitchell N.
Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1 (2004); Kermit Roosevelt III, Constitutional
Calcification: How the Law Becomes What the Court Does, 91 VA. L. REV. 1649 (2005). For my small
contribution to this literature, see Andrew M. Siegel, Equal Protection Unmodified: Justice John Paul
Stevens and the Casefor Unmediated Constitutional Interpretation, 74 FORDHAML. REV. 2339 (2006).
78. Roosevelt, supra note 77, at 1689-92; see G. Edward White, Historicizing Judicial Scrutiny,
57 S.C. L. REV. 1, 7-65 (2005) (describing the history of several important traditional and modern
constitutional doctrines).
79. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162 (2007); see also Deborah Brake,
What Counts as "Discrimination" in Ledbetter and the Implications for Sex Equality Law, 59 S.C. L.
REV. 657 (2008) (discussing the decision's effect on present and future antidiscrimination laws
promulgated by Congress).
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world."8 Well, you can say that about a lot of cases decided by the Roberts Court.8
My favorite example is one near and dear to my present life: the Seattle schools
case.82 I live in Seattle now, and it does not take a genius to understand how
disconnected from reality the Court was in that case. I could give you a twenty-
minute tour that proves how complicit the city of Seattle was in creating and
perpetuating the racial segregation of the school system. Just take a tour and look
at how many tiny elementary schools there are that are several blocks from other
schools. Why is that? In large measure, I think the record in Seattle suggests it's
because breaking neighborhoods into microneighborhoods allows a city to maintain
different schools for different races. If Seattle had built the number of schools that
you would expect them to have, they would have had to draw the attendance zones
broadly enough to have multiracial schools in a time where that was not particularly
acceptable. Or look at the fact that the Seattle school district has drawn up its
uniform policies so that in the central cluster where I live the three schools that are
predominately white have been able to opt out of a supposedly mandatory school
uniform policy.83 The kids at these schools go to school dressed like children in
fashion catalogues, while the children who attend schools that are predominately
minority almost all wear uniforms; the result is that everyone knows where these
children go to school simply by looking at their uniforms. It is a different kind of
discipline, a different kind of marking. (And, I could give you many more examples
of the ways in which Seattle maintains what are fundamentally two separate public
school systems.)
The Indiana voter identification case that came before the Supreme Court this
year84 is another case worth mentioning, particularly because it involves the
application of one of the rules relating to class and the Equal Protection Clause.
Precedent states that significant limitations on the right to vote must usually pass
strict scrutiny. Crawford v. Marion County Election Board raises the issues of
whether strict scrutiny applies to the new voter identification rules that some states
have adopted and whether those rules pass scrutiny.86 In looking at the transcript of
the oral argument in that case, you see a Court that is skeptical about real world
concerns. In this case, the Court was very skeptical that anyone would be unable to
80. Justice Denied? The Implications of the Supreme Court's Ledbetter v. Goodyear Employment
Discrimination Decision: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 110th Cong. 10 (2007)
(statement of Lilly Ledbetter, Former Goodyear Employee and Plaintiff in Ledbetter v. Goodyear).
81. See, e.g., Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at 2369 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that the "hardship and
unfairness" created by the trial judge's erroneous deadline could have been alleviated by use of
equitable doctrines).
82. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
83. See SEATTLE PUBLIC SCHOOLS, SEATTLE PUBLIC SCHOOLS ELEMENTARY SCHOOL CHOICES
2008 09: ENROLLMENT CHOICES FOR PARENTS 24 (2007) [hereinafter SEATTLE PUBLIC SCHOOLS],
available at http: //www.seattleschools.org/area/eso/elementary_guide.pdf (noting that four out of five
predominately minority elementary schools in the central clusterhave uniform policies but that Stevens,
Montlake, and McGilvra Elementary Schools do not).
84. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008).
85. See Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 627-29 (1969).
86. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1616 21.
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find a way to get to the requisite government agency to obtain their identification
cards and that such a statute could really be a burden on anyone."
My fourth reason to be skeptical about the Roberts Courts is the Court's
willingness to overrule precedent. Remember that in several of the Rehnquist Court
cases discussed above, Justice Thomas argued that the Court's pragmatic
accommodationist precedents with regard to class are mushy-headed and should be
overruled.88 Justice Thomas did not have too many friends on the prior Court, in
large measure because, all things being equal, the Rehnquist Court needed a really
good reason to overrule precedent. While it was willing to overrule precedent in
areas that it thought were really important, such as federalism,89 this was not
something that the Court did just because it found a decision wrongly decided. I
think the culture of the Roberts Court may well be different. Part and parcel of the
Roberts Court's emerging formalism and the general style of reasoning that came
out of the Reagan Justice Department is the idea that there is something noble about
overruling precedents that were wrongly decided.
In practice, the Roberts Court appears quite willing to overrule precedent. Just
look at last Term. One of the most-quoted comments of the Term was Justice
Breyer's complaint on the last day of the Term that "[i]t is not often in law that so
few have so quickly changed so much."9 Well, it is worth noting that he was not
just referring to the Seattle schools case;9 he was frustrated about a lot of other
cases too. On that last day of the term, he dissented from the bench not just in the
Seattle schools case 92 but also in Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS,
Inc., a fairly technical antitrust case in which his main objection was that the
Court abandoned a doctrine that had been around for a hundred years for no other
reason than the fact that a few economists thought it was a bad rule.94 Of course,
Gonzales v. Carhart95 is another example. 96
And finally, though it is only tangentially related, I want to mention the Roberts
Court's palpable hostility to litigation. I have previously suggested that litigation
87. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 28, Crawford, 128 S. C. 1610 (No. 07-21). For instance,
Justice Souter posed the following question: "And how many of [the voters without identification cards]
are going to suffer from an unreasonable denial of an opportunity to get the ID which the State will
provide through the Bureau of Motor Vehicles'?" Id. As the oral argument predicted, the Court
ultimately rejected the constitutional challenge, largely out of skepticism about the consequences ofthe
statute. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1621 23.
88. See, e.g., M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 133 (1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("I do not think
that the equal protection theory underlying the Griffin line of cases remains viable." (referring to Griffin
v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), and its progeny)).
89. See cases cited supra note 27.
90. Anthony Lewis, The Court: How 'So Few Have So Quickly Changed So Much, 'N.Y. REv.
BOOKS, Dec. 20,2007, at 58 (internal quotationmarks omitted), available athttp: //www.nybooks.com/
articles/20899 (reviewing JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME
COURT (2007)). This statement was made in reaction to the majority's decision in the Seattle schools
case. Id.
91. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. C. 2738 (2007).
92. Id. at 2800-37 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
93. 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2721 23 (2007), overruling Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park& Sons Co.,
220 U.S. 373 (1911).
94. Id. at 2725-26 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
95. 127 S. C. 1610 (2007).
96. Id. at 1640 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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hostility was the single most important theme of the Rehnquist era,9 7 but the theme
certainly did not dominate the Rehnquist Court's jurisprudence to the extent that
it has dominated the current Court's thus far.98 In the context of this panel, it is
worth reminding ourselves that litigation is, at least in its idealized form, one of the
most democratic institutions we have. The idea of litigation is powerfully
democratic: Anyone of any social status can drag their so-called betters into court
and make them answer before a body whose job it is to neutrally adjudicate that
dispute. Now we know that is not how the system works in all its details, but it is
an ideal and an ideal that has been respected in ourj urisprudence or at least given
lip service in our jurisprudence-for most of this country's history. 99
Well, the Rehnquist Court-not just the conservative Justices but some of the
liberal Justices as well showed less respect for that principle than judges have
historically accorded. Your numbers may vary, but somewhere around 25% to 30%
of the Rehnquist Court's cases were about access to the courts, availability of
litigation, or rooting out theories of statutory interpretation that were
prolitigation."'0 In the Roberts Court, that number has continued to rise. One
commentator has gone so far as to call the 2006 Term "the year [the Court] closed
the courts."'' In its early months, the 2007 Term has been more of the same. As of
mid-February 2008, more than half of the decided cases involved access to the
courts, remedies, theories of statutory interpretation, or other issues that implicate
how litigation positive we want our culture to be. And those arguing in favor of
litigation and access to the courts have won even fewer cases under the Roberts
Court than their counterparts under the Rehnquist Court. 102
V. CONCLUSION
To summarize my argument, my proposition is that though the class and
poverty advocates of the late 1960s and early 1970s were not happy with the
constitutional settlement and felt like it was an abandonment of the poor, writing
97. Siegel, supra note 26; see also Daniel J. Meltzer, The Supreme Court's Judicial Passivity,
2002 SuP. CT. REv. 343, 343 (2002) ("[T]he Court has sought, across a broad range of subject matters,
to reduce the role ofjudicial lawmaking and to refuse to take responsibility for shaping aworkable legal
system. ); Judith Resnik, Constricting Remedies: The Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress, and Federal
Power, 78 IND. L.J. 223, 224 (2003) (arguing that the Court has, in some of its opinions, "opin[ed] to
Congress ... about which litigants ought to be able to bring substantive claims to the federal courts").
98. Posting of Andrew Siegel to PrawfsBlawg, http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2007/
06/hostility toli.html (June 6, 2007, 10:41 EST).
99. See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380 81 (1971) (guaranteeing indigent
defendants in civil suits the same access to judicial procedures and protections afforded to wealthier
parties); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68 (1932) (describing the right of indigent defendants to be
heard via the right to counsel in criminal proceedings).
100. Cf Siegel, supra note 26, at 1118 n.70 (reporting that twenty-four of seventy-four cases from
one Rehnquist Court Term dealt with "the scope or availability of a statutory remedy, qualified or
sovereign immunity, the availability of attorney's fees, preemption, or justiciability").
101. Linda Greenhouse, In Steps Big and Small, Supreme Court Moved Right, N.Y. TIMES, July
1, 2007, at Al (quoting Professor Judith Resnik).
102. For two of the many recent antilitigation opinions, see Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct.
999, 1011 (2008) (holding that federal law preempts many state common law claims against medical
device manufacturers); Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. CE 761,773-74
(2008) (limiting private right of action for securities fraud).
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them out of the Constitution, the settlement that they were left with did provide the
poor with some interstitial constitutional protection. The Rehnquist Court stayed
out of this area as much as it could, but when it did weigh in, protected the basic
premises of that settlement. Based on the early returns, there are some serious
reasons to think that the Roberts Court will not do the same.
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